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Abstract
Scholars and policymakers have highlighted institutions that enable community partic-
ipation as a potential buffer against existing political inequalities. Yet, these venues
may be biasing policy discussions in favor of an unrepresentative group of individu-
als. To explore who participates, we compile a novel data set by coding thousands
of instances of citizens speaking at planning and zoning board meetings concerning
housing development. We match individuals to a voter file to investigate local political
participation in housing and development policy. We find that individuals who are older,
male, longtime residents, voters in local elections, and homeowners are significantly
more likely to participate in these meetings. These individuals overwhelmingly (and to
a much greater degree than the general public) oppose new housing construction. These
participatory inequalities have important policy implications and may be contributing
to rising housing costs.
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Many local leaders view neighborhood activism and participation as a key source of
policy information and a critical form of civic engagement. Almost half of mayors selected
neighborhood meetings as one of the top two ways they learn about their constituents’
views (Einstein, Glick, and LeBlanc 2017), and the National League of Cities highlighted
neighborhood meetings as a critical component of community engagement (Hoene, Kingsley,
and Leighninger 2013). The celebration of neighborhood participation is not new. President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s Community Action Program—part of the 1964 Economic Opportunity
Act—institutionalized neighborhood involvement in the allocation of federal urban spending.
President Jimmy Carter made neighborhoods a cornerstone of his administration’s housing
programs (Carter 1980). Scholars of local government and normative theorists more broadly
contend that institutions that spur neighborhood-based political participation help provide
voice to underrepresented groups, enhance citizen efficacy, and are integral to a thriving
democracy (Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993; Fung 2006; Michels and Graaf 2010; Stone
and Stoker 2015). Moreover, such institutions may offer opportunities for compromise via
deliberative democracy (Gutmann and Thompson 2012). Indeed, the local level may offer the
most potential to benefit from such institutions as participation and efficacy are greater in
smaller jurisdictions (Oliver 2001; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012).
In some ways, local institutions that enable direct citizen involvement echo national efforts
to increase political participation among socioeconomically disadvantaged voters. In response
to participatory inequalities, some policymakers and advocates have pursued a variety of
initiatives designed to facilitate registration, offer more early voting, and shorten lines at
polling places, for example. These policies may, however, have unanticipated consequences.
In some cases, they may exacerbate the very inequities they attempt to solve. Berinsky (2005)
finds that reforms designed to facilitate voting actually increase socioeconomic inequalities
in turnout; de Kadt (2017) uncovers a similar phenomenon in South Africa. Burden et al.
(2013) discover that, while Election Day registration has a positive effect on overall turnout,
early voting appears to decrease turnout in isolation.
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Institutions designed to encourage and empower neighborhood participation in local
politics could also have distorting consequences for the distribution of influence. We examine
this possibility using the substantively important case of housing policy. In the wake
of the excesses of urban renewal (Rae 2004; Schleicher 2013) and the dominance of pro-
growth, developer-oriented urban politics (Logan and Molotch 1987), local governments
have promulgated institutions designed to constrain developers and empower neighborhood-
level and environmental interests (Logan and Rabrenovic 1990; Gerber and Phillips 2003;
Glaeser and Ward 2009; Schleicher 2013). One example is a movement in many localities
to allow and encourage neighborhood participation in zoning and planning board meetings.
Such participation gives neighbors an opportunity to inform appointed board members and
local elected officials of their views on projects ranging from large developments to modest
renovations. It also offers the potential to extract concessions from developers (sometimes
directly (Hankinson 2013)).
However, greater participation may amplify some voices more than others. The concen-
trated costs of development projects in particular may create strong incentives for neigh-
borhood groups that are highly affected by a proposal to mobilize against development.
In contrast, the diffuse benefits of an increased housing supply are less likely to motivate
participation from the broader population of a city/region that might benefit from more
housing. Land use regulations may provide these highly motivated individuals the tools with
which to restrict higher density projects.
This failure to construct an adequate supply of housing has important policy consequences.
The Obama White House identified national housing affordability as a critical policy challenge,
arguing that “the growing severity of undersupplied housing markets is jeopardizing housing
affordability for working families, increasing income inequality by reducing less-skilled workers’
access to high-wage labor markets, and stifling GDP growth by driving labor migration
away from the most productive regions” (White House 2016). The lack of affordable housing
in areas with high mobility could have a profound negative impact on many children’s life
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opportunities (Chetty, Herdren, and Katz 2016). While housing crises in some of the nation’s
coastal cities has been the focus of media attention, a lack of affordable housing is a national
crisis. There is not a single county in the country in which a minimum-wage earner can afford
an average two-bedroom rental (National Low Income Housing Coalition 2017). Housing
affordability and supply are inextricably linked. Economists have attributed the current
affordability crisis in large part to insufficient supply (Quigley and Rosenthal 2005; Glaeser,
Gyourko, and Saks 2005; Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 2008; Glaeser and Ward 2009; Glaeser
2011; Gyourko and Molloy 2014; Hsieh and Moretti 2015). Moreover, insufficient housing
supply may hamper efforts at environmental sustainability. Greater housing density helps
reduce sprawl (Glaeser 2011) and is a cornerstone of local efforts to mitigate climate change
(Barro 2017).
We ask how participation may play a role in restricting development. To assess local
political participation, previous studies have relied primarily on surveys (Hankinson 2018;
Marble and Nall 2017; Wong 2018), voting (Fischel 2001; Gerber and Phillips 2003; Wong
2018), case studies of meetings (Mansbridge 1980; Fiorina 1998), and aggregate-level analyses
of meeting participation (Fung 2006). In contrast, we rely on directly observing both who
participates in policy discussions about housing development, and how they participate.
We do so across a range of communities by compiling and coding new data on all citizen
participants in planning Board and zoning board meetings dealing with the construction
of multiple housing units in 97 Massachusetts cities and towns. We match thousands of
individual participants to the Massachusetts voter file to explore who participates in local
political meetings. This data set is the first comprehensive effort to measure the behavior of
community meeting participants. Moreover, we juxtapose the opinions of meetings attendees
with the vote on a statewide housing ballot referendum to provide a novel comparison
of attendee views with those of the broader public. This allows us to learn two separate
attributes of meeting attendees: (1) whether they are demographically representative of their
broader communities, and; (2) whether they are attitudinally representative of their broader
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communities.
We find that meeting participants are unrepresentative of the broader public in a variety
of ways. They are more likely to be older, male, longtime residents, voters in local elections,
and homeowners. Moreover, these individuals overwhelmingly oppose the construction of
new housing: almost two-thirds of these participants speak out in opposition to new housing
development. A sizable minority of meeting participants—especially housing opponents—
are repeat participators who attend multiple meetings to speak out about local housing
projects. Meeting attendees generally raise a wide variety of issues, from concerns about
local trees to traffic. These results suggest that the structure of public meetings surrounding
housing development likely contributes to a failure in many locations to produce a sufficient
housing supply. More broadly, they reveal that institutions designed to enhance democratic
responsiveness may have perverse consequences on participation, the views that policymakers
hear, and/or outcomes.
This article makes two important contributions. First, while a multitude of political
science studies have identified inequalities in political participation, this article is the first
able to document inequalities in who shows up to salient public meetings. Rather than
using surveys or vote returns, this study is the only one to our knowledge that directly
observes participants in politics to precisely measure inequalities. Second, it makes a novel
theoretical argument about the nature of participation in housing policy. We argue, that
even in areas where public opinion broadly favors redressing housing shortages with increased
supply, specific housing development proposals will disproportionately garner opposition that
is empowered by local institutions. In the housing policy arena, institutions and behavior




At the heart of all of the predictions outlined below are general and fundamental questions
about grass-roots democracy. Throughout our analysis, we consider two competing views
about neighborhood-level civic engagement on housing policy. The first is that these meetings
are an opportunity for efficacious civic engagement, mediation of competing interests (Dahl
1961; Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993), and deliberative democracy (Gutmann and
Thompson 2012). The second, in contrast, views neighborhood activism as captured by a
small, unrepresentative group with strong views (Mansbridge 1980; Fiorina 1998; Kain 2012).
A wide body of scholarship in American politics suggests that more socioeconomically
advantaged individuals are more likely to participate and to have their voices amplified
in key policy discussions (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Gilens 2014; Hajnal and
Trounstine 2016). Political science research also generally finds higher levels of political
participation among the elderly, who have the time, resources, and policy interest that
allow for and encourage involvement in politics (Campbell 2005; Schlozman, Verba, and
Brady 2012). Those that have lived in the same place for a greater duration (Kang and
Kwak 2003; Gay 2012), and own their homes (Fischel 2001) also participate in politics at
higher rates. Men—especially white men—are more likely to engage in direct contact and
collective action relative to women (Mansbridge 1980; Kittilson 2016). We suspect these
broad findings will also apply to participants in neighborhood meetings. This would fit with
research on participatory small-group decision processes that contends that such institutions
are unrepresentative in similar ways to other forms of political participation (Mansbridge
1980; Sanders 1997).
While participatory inequalities have been widely studied—though not precisely empirically
measured—it is less obvious whether meeting attendees will be predisposed to hold particular
attitudes. Accounts of anti-development, NIMBY (not in my backyard) sentiments among
homeowners generally predominate urban politics research (Fischel 2001; Hankinson 2018).
Many contemporary commentaries on housing, however, point to the influence of a new
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housing coalition featuring poverty and affordable housing advocates, developers, and urban
planners as a potential check on NIMBY sentiments from entrenched homeowners (Semuels
2017; Yglesias 2017). Indeed, recent evidence from ballot initiatives and surveys suggests
that, in liberal communities, mixed-income developments may generate at least some public
support, with individuals basing their preferences for housing on ideology rather than pure
economic self-interest (Wong 2018).
We argue that the development of new housing may disproportionately induce participa-
tion from individuals with unrepresentative opinions. The potential externalities of housing
proposals are spatially concentrated while the benefits are diffuse. Proposed housing de-
velopments have potentially profound effects on neighborhood property values, amenities,
and quality of life (Fischel 2001). Increasing the housing supply reduces housing prices
(Quigley and Rosenthal 2005; Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005; Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers
2008; Glaeser and Ward 2009; Glaeser 2011; Gyourko and Molloy 2014; Hsieh and Moretti
2015). This reduction in housing prices would adversely impact the economic interests of
local homeowners. Interestingly, renters may also feel that new housing developments are
detrimental to their economic interests. Recent experimental evidence suggests that renters
in high-cost housing markets believe that new developments will raise their rents (Hankinson
2018).
Moreover, housing developments frequently represent stark changes in neighborhood
environments and composition. Studies of racial and ethnic politics have found such rapid
changes to be strong motivators for attitudes and behavior (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong
1998; Hopkins 2010; Enos 2016).
In contrast, we anticipate that proponents of new housing development will be compar-
atively less likely to attend meetings on proposed projects. The economic benefits of new
housing supply are diffuse. Any change in housing affordability from a single project is likely
to be barely perceptible, particularly when weighed against the visible costs experienced by a
narrower subset of the neighborhood. Indeed, even if the benefits were comparable, prospect
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theory suggests that losses have a greater impact on behavior than equivalently sized gains
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Moreover, at least some of the individuals most likely to
benefit from a new housing development (potential new residents) live outside the jurisdiction
in which the development is proposed. In contrast, virtually all of those experiencing the
costs of new housing already reside in that jurisdiction. Relative to supporters, then, housing
development opponents are more likely to: (1) be informed about developments happening in
their community and (2) be able to target their own appointed/elected officials in voicing
their views about housing. Both information (Lassen 2005) and efficacy (Shingles 1981;
Finkel 1985) are positively associated with political participation.
Interestingly, this bias towards opposition to specific projects may differentiate housing
from some other areas. We contend that even those individuals who are predisposed to
support the construction of affordable housing in the abstract will inclined to oppose specific
housing project proposals in their communities. This sharply differs from immigration
policy, for example. Iyengar et al. (2013) find that citizens in advanced industrialized
democracies support the admission of individual immigrants, while generally opposing more
open immigration policies.
In addition, we also anticipate that those who participate will do so with high intensity
and frequency. The factors listed above that should disproportionately spur opposition to
local housing development will likely also foment strong public opinions. Intense viewpoints
are linked with a greater propensity for political participation (Fiorina 1998; Kain 2012;
Pew Research Center 2014). Therefore, we expect meeting attendees in general—and, in
particular, opponents of new housing development—to attend repeat meetings.
Finally, we expect participants to exhibit high levels of expertise. In previous predictions,
we suggested that participants are likely to be socioeconomically advantaged and perceive
significant costs of proposed housing developments. We might expect a highly educated
group that views changes to the housing stock as a major threat to learn about and cite
local zoning laws and land use regulations. They may also solicit the views of experts—such
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as lawyers, engineers, architects, and other real estate professionals—to provide strong and
well-sourced arguments about a potential housing development. This expertise might lead
to well-informed neighborhood dialogue, but, it could also exacerbate political inequalities.
Lupia and Norton (2017) suggest that deliberative democracy may not work as intended if
participating interlocutors use sophisticated language as a form of political power to drown
out other policy discussion.
Perhaps strikingly in the context of rising national partisan polarization (Abramowitz
2010), we do not expect partisanship to predict participation in housing meetings or to
affect the issues that individuals raise. While partisanship certainly impacts local politics
(Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2016), we anticipate that the immediacy
of neighborhood-level concerns will swamp partisan leanings on housing issues. Indeed, Marble
and Nall (2017) use survey experiments to show that liberal homeowners—while generally
favorable towards redistributive programs—prioritize their home values over their ideological
preference for affordable housing (though see (Wong 2018)).
2 Data and Methods
To evaluate who participates, we assembled a novel data set of all citizen participants in
planning board and zoning board meetings between 2015-2017 in 97 cities and towns in
metropolitan Boston. One reason we focused on Massachusetts is data availability. As a
consequence of the Commonwealth’s open meeting law, Massachusetts localities are required
to provide detailed meeting minutes for all public bodies. These minutes must include “a
summary of the discussions on each subject.” A majority of cities/towns in metropolitan
Boston have interpreted this to mean including the names and addresses of all members of
the public who spoke at the meeting.
In addition to the data availability, the Boston metro region has other advantageous traits
for studying participation in the hyper local politics of housing development. While compact,
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the Boston metro area includes an unusual number of independent cities and towns. Indeed,
there are dozens of autonomous local communities with their own demographics, politics,
and local regulations within 50 miles of Boston. Boston’s surrounding communities range
from small, leafy, “bedroom” towns to more diverse small cities. The housing stock in the
area includes estates, modest starter homes, three family “triple deckers,” and taller modern
apartment buildings. While the eastern Massachusetts economy and housing marking are
doing quite well relative to other parts of the country, there is still great variation across
municipalities in terms of housing demand, availability, and cost. Moreover, the strength
of the overall housing market is an asset for this study because it means there is demand
for housing, and a market for new development, almost everywhere. Lastly, the fact that
Eastern Massachusetts is generally liberal makes it a difficult test for some of the hypotheses.
It is disproportionately populated by people who, in the abstract, would tend to support
more housing and efforts at improving access to affordable housing.
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics about a variety of traits (mean, minimum and
maximum) for the 97 cities and towns for which we have coded meeting comments. As the
data show, our sample is, as would be expected in eastern Massachusetts, relatively white
(86% on average) and affluent. More important than the means are the ranges of these
variables, many of which are directly pertinent to the theoretical expectations. For example,
the sample has tremendous variation in terms of residential density (237 to nearly 17,000
people per square mile), housing prices ($200K to $1.2MM median), population growth (0%
to 11% from 2010-2015), and age (9% to 28% over 65).
To assemble our dataset, we downloaded all available public hearing minutes for local
planning and zoning boards. In all cities and towns, these are the two bodies responsible for
reviewing any housing developments not permitted by right under local zoning code. Such
housing projects were publicly reviewed by one or both bodies in such cases. In many of these
meetings, owners or developers are petitioning for variances (exceptions) to the underlying
regulations. Under Chapter 40A in Massachusetts, all public hearings for such bodies are
10
Table 1: Traits of cities and towns for which we have participation data
mean min max
Population 25772 4427 183382
Population Density 1976 237 16880
Population Growth 2010-2015 5 -0 11
Median Age 42 24 53
Percent Over 65 15 9 28
Percent White 86 17 98
Percent Black 2 0 15
Percent Hispanic 5 0 76
Median Household Income 97650 34852 199519
Median House Price 431844 205200 1170400
Distance from Boston (miles) 24 4 43
Observations 97
published in “a newspaper of general circulation in the city or town once in each of the two
successive weeks, the first publication to be not less than fourteen days before the day of the
hearing.” Cities/towns also are required to post a notice “in a conspicuous place in the city
or town hall” with similar advanced notice. Moreover, the city/town also must mail a notice
of a public hearing to “parties of interest,” which are defined as “the petitioner, abutters,
owners of land directly opposition on any public or private street or way, and abutters to the
abutters within three hundred feet of the property line of the petitioner as they appear on
the most recent applicable tax list” (Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2017). We utilized all
minutes that were posted on cities’ and towns’ websites.
The public hearings captured in our database covered a wide range of policy areas,
ranging from the construction of large multifamily or mixed use housing developments with
hundreds of rental units to the addition of wireless communication towers. We focus on all
hearings concerning housing developments featuring the construction of more than one unit
of housing.1 This focus reflects our interest in the politics of increasing housing supply via
1By definition, all meetings are those in which a developer or homeowner is asking for an exemption to the
local zoning code. Projects approved by right do not go through the local zoning process. It is possible that
only those projects that require an exemption generate public opposition. Indeed, the drawing of these maps
is in and of itself intensely political (Rothstein 2017). The meeting minutes feature many citizen opponents
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densifying communities with high demand. Even within this more limited policy category,
public meeting minutes exhibit enormous variation. Some of these projects are relatively
small (e.g. a family seeking to add an accessory apartment), while others are expansive
proposals from large professional development companies. Some meetings feature comments
from one neighbor who shows up to support a friend in obtaining a variance from local zoning
regulations. Others, in contrast, are filled with dozens of comments from residents with deep
concerns about a proposed project.
Using these minutes, we created a database of all public comments surrounding the
development of more than one housing unit. Each observation—which is at the comment
level—includes the name and address of the meeting participant.2 We also code whether
the individual supports, opposes, or is neutral about a proposed housing project. Finally,
when available, we also include a code describing the reason(s) the participant expressed
along with her support/opposition/neutrality. These reasons encompassed a wide variety
of topics, including parking, environmental concerns, traffic, density, affordability, noise,
aesthetics/history, property values and septic systems, among others.3 A full codebook
describing these categories and criteria for inclusion is included in the appendix. Because
some of the meeting minutes provide extraordinary detail—including in some cases exact
transcripts of proceedings—we are also able to also analyze valuable qualitative data.
Even without merging these data with any other information, we can make valuable
observations. Because each public comment is an observation, we can calculate the proportion
of meeting attendees who are repeat participants (and how many meetings these individuals
attend). Moreover, we can learn the proportion of individuals who support/oppose the
development of additional housing and the reasons they typically cite.
to changes in the zoning code as well (these individuals are not included in the data set analyzed here).
2If an individual speaks multiple times at a meeting about different housing developments, she receives
one observation per housing project. If participant makes multiple comments about the same project at the
same meeting, her comments are concatenated into one observation. Finally, if the same individual attends
multiple meetings to comment about the same project, she is coded as one observation per meeting.
3Intercoder reliability checks showed that coders agreed 100% of the time about whether a comment
should be labeled support/oppose/neutral. They selected the same set of 19 total topic categories 85% of the
time.
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What’s more, because we have the names and addresses of these individuals, we can merge
them with data from the Massachusetts voter file to learn more about their demographics.
Using a fuzzy matching algorithm, we link meeting commenters with registered MA voters.4
We were able to match 2,580 of the 3,123 people in the set of participants (82.6%). As many
people commented more than once, we were able to match the speakers of 85.4% of the
comments to the voter file.
The voter file offers some important demographic data about these meeting participants,
and allows us to compare these individuals to city/town-level demographics. In particular,
the voter file provides data on individuals’ age, gender, partisanship, history of voter turnout
in elections at all levels, and registration date at current address (which we use as a rough
proxy for duration of residence). While this analysis obviously will not convey a complete
picture of (un)representativeness—it does not include income or race, most notably—it offers
unprecedented insight into the individuals who participate in local democratic proceedings.
3 Results
We begin by using the voter file to compare those who participated in local meetings to those
in their towns who did not. Table 2 presents the difference in means between commenters and
non-commenters. On average, meeting participants are older, have lived at their residence for
longer (proxied by the length of their voter registration at that location), and are more likely
to be men. Women constitute 51.3% of the voter file, but only 43.3% of the commenters
at development meetings. As expected, we find no differences in partisanship. Democrats,
Republicans, and Independent/Unaffiliated voters participate at similar rates. There are
significant differences based on vote history. The individuals who participated in development
4We matched on name and address, the only data on participants available. Due to a large number of
typos and misspellings, we used a fuzzy string matching algorithm and manual review of the matches. A
majority of the people who we were unable to match are likely in the voter file, but could not be matched
due to name duplication and missing addresses.
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meetings voted at roughly twice the frequency of those who did not.5
Table 2: Difference in Means Between Commenters and All Voters
Commenters Non-Commenters
Variable N Mean N Mean Difference
Age 2,566 58.711 1,535,520 50.893 7.818**
Reg. Length 2,580 17.377 1,618,375 11.828 5.549**
Female 2,580 0.433 1,618,375 0.513 -0.080**
Reg. Democrat 2,580 0.320 1,618,375 0.317 0.002
Reg. Republican 2,580 0.112 1,618,375 0.111 0.001
Reg. Independent 2,580 0.566 1,618,375 0.563 0.002
% Elections Voted 2,580 0.502 1,618,375 0.272 0.230**
Table 3 presents logit models using the full voter file, where the dependent variable is an
indicator of whether or not the resident participated in a development meeting. The first
specification includes only individual-level variables, the second includes town-level controls
(town averages for each individual variable), and the third includes town-level fixed effects.
The results are consistent across all three specifications.6 Voters are more likely to participate
when they are older, have lived in the same address for longer, and vote more frequently.
Female voters are less likely to participate, and we observe no partisan differences. These
results broadly confirm that meeting participants are demographically unrepresentative of
their towns in ways consistent with our theoretical predictions.
One key independent variable that we cannot assess using the voter file is homeownership.
While we are unable to collect homeownership data for the thousands of commenters in
the data, we did match the 85 individuals who participated in the Town of Arlington’s
Zoning and Planning Board meetings with data from the Registry of Deeds. We selected
the Town of Arlington because: (1) the relatively high number of comments (122 comments
from 85 individuals) in the town allowed us to make reliable comparisons with town-level
5% Elections Voted is calculated as the share of elections between 2010 and 2016 in which in individual
voted. The total number of possible elections varies by town.
6We also examined various subsample models, including restricting the data to towns with at least 15
commenters. Such restrictions do not have any meaningful effect on the results.
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Table 3: Logit Models of Commenters Relative to Full Voter File
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.005** 0.003* 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Reg. Length 0.012** 0.019** 0.017**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.391** -0.404** -0.408**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Reg. Democrat 0.039 0.100 0.109
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070)
Reg. Independent 0.113 0.149* 0.158*
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
% Elections Voted 2.218** 2.052** 2.088**
(0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
Observations 1,538,086 1,538,086 1,538,086
Towns 97 97 97
Town Controls X
Town FEs X
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
demographics, and (2) the town has a good mix of homeowners and renters (39% of the
population are renters and 61% homeowners). We find that, consistent with our predictions,
homeowners are significantly overrepresented as meeting participants; while 39% of the town
rents, renters only comprise 22% of participants.
Next, we assess the proportion of meeting attendees in our full data set who participated
in multiple meetings. Somewhat in contrast with our predictions, most participants only
attended a single meeting. Eight-three percent of the commenters in our sample spoke at
only one meeting. The average person made 1.3 comments, and 45 people made five or more
comments. Among the participants that we matched to the voter file, the only significant
predictor of the number of comments made is political party. Democrats were less likely to
make multiple comments, and Republicans were more likely to do so.
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3.1 Predicting Commenter Positions
Turning to the positions expressed by meeting participants, the overwhelming majority
of attendees spoke out in opposition to proposed new housing. Sixty-three percent of all
comments were in opposition to proposed housing projects, while only 14.6% expressed
support; the remaining 22.8% of comments were neutral. These results strongly suggest that,
as predicted, the incentives to show up and oppose new housing are far stronger than those
to participate in support.
We also use individual-level variables to predict which participants oppose new housing.
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. Consistent with theoretical predictions, all else
equal, those who appeared at multiple meetings are more likely to speak in opposition. Women
and infrequent voters are also more inclined, on average, towards opposition. Democrats, in
contrast, are more likely to support projects and less likely to be neutral or oppose them
than independent or Republican participants. This last finding is consistent with Democrats
having more progressive views on housing (Marble and Nall 2017), but contrasts with much of
the media coverage on the NIMBY movement, which suggests that NIMBYism is particularly
prevalent among progressives (Capps 2015; Paul 2015). Our results suggest that, within
the progressive places facing housing crises likely to engender NIMBYism, Republicans are
more likely show up to meetings in opposition to new housing. This finding suggests that
liberal homeowners and renters may, in some instances, overcome a neighborhood-based
opposition to new housing (Hankinson 2018; Marble and Nall 2017) to support more dense
housing consistent with their ideological preferences. Overall, though, support for new housing
remains low among both affiliates of both parties: only 19.4% of Democrats and 12.8% of
Republicans expressed support for proposed projects at public meetings.
The failure of individual-level demographics like age and gender to predict opposition to
housing construction is methodologically important. We theorized that meeting participants
would be weighted towards opposition because of a combination of the concentrated costs of
new housing, prospect theory, and residence in the jurisdiction where housing is proposed.
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Table 4: Logit Models of Commenter Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV=Support DV=Neutral DV=Oppose DV=Neutral or Oppose
Age 0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Reg. Length 0.004 -0.013** 0.007 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Female -0.253** 0.013 0.123 0.253**
(0.098) (0.080) (0.070) (0.098)
Reg. Democrat 0.466** 0.113 -0.360** -0.479**
(0.163) (0.139) (0.119) (0.163)
Reg. Independent -0.041 0.214 -0.153 0.027
(0.158) (0.129) (0.111) (0.158)
% Elections Voted 0.664** 0.159 -0.460** -0.653**
(0.155) (0.127) (0.111) (0.155)
Number of comments -0.038 -0.052* 0.058** 0.038
(0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029)
Observations 3,629 3,629 3,629 3,629
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
A propensity towards opposition, however, could also simply be a consequence of the un-
representative demographics of meeting participants; perhaps older men, for example, are
both more likely to participate in planning and zoning meetings and more likely to oppose
the construction of new housing. Instead, we find that the predictors of participation in
meetings are completely different from those that explain positions in meetings. Older and
male individuals are more likely to participate in meetings, but, conditional on participation,
age and gender do not predict opposition to new housing.
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3.2 Support for Housing in the Voting Booth, Opposition at Meet-
ings
We have demonstrated that a large majority of individuals who attend zoning and planning
board meetings express opposition to the projects under consideration. To assess if such
opposition is disproportionate, we compare meeting participation to the results of an important
ballot referendum concerning housing policy. In 2010, Massachusetts held a referendum to
repeal Chapter 40B, a law promoting affordable housing that permits developers to bypass
local zoning regulations if: (1) the town’s housing stock is less than 10% affordable and (2)
at least 20-25% of the proposed units have long-term affordability restrictions. Across the
state, a majority of voters favored keeping the law, and the referendum to repeal Chapter
40B failed with only 42% of the vote.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the vote supporting 40B by town. Across the cities in
our sample, 56% of voters in the referendum adopted the pro-affordable housing position and
opposed repeal of Chapter 40B, and there was majority support against repeal in 61 of the
96 towns.7 This comports with state-level figures, where 58% of voters opposed the repeal.
This is a significantly greater level of support than evinced by the mere 15% of meeting
commenters who spoke in support of the construction of new housing. This is especially
striking given that Chapter 40B deals exclusively with affordable housing. We would expect
opposition to affordable housing to be greater than opposition to market-rate housing based
on prior scholarship on public opinion surrounding housing (Tighe 2010).8 If anything, then,
our measure of general public opinion is biased towards opposition, and should be more
similar to the opinions evinced in our meetings minutes. The relative toughness of this
particular test makes the 40-percentage point difference between 40B support and support
for housing projects at public meetings all the more striking.
7We do not have 40B repeal results for Boylston, MA.
8Only 3% of negative comments cited affordability. Thus, there is little evidence that our commenter
data would be biased towards opposition because it featured market-rate, rather than affordable, housing
developments.
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Figure 2 shows the relationship between town-level vote against repealing Chapter 40B
and the percentage of comments in each town that were supportive of multifamily housing
developments.9 While there is a positive correlation between opposition to the 40B repeal and
positive comments, in every town, fewer than half of the meeting comments were positive. For
example, in Cambridge, the town with the highest support for 40B (80% of voters opposed
repeal), only 40% of comments at development meetings supported multifamily housing.
Indeed, almost every town in Massachusetts exhibited higher support for Chapter 40B than
for the development of specific multifamily housing projects. While voters in these towns
supported affordable housing construction in the abstract, a significant majority of those
who attended development meetings opposed the development of specific project proposals.
3.3 Reasons Expressed for Supporting and Opposing Development
Finally, we also investigate the reasons individuals cited when expressing their support/opposition
on housing projects. While many meeting minutes simply noted whether participating indi-
viduals supported or opposed a project, some provided greater detail—in some cases exact
transcripts of individuals’ comments. Figure 3 shows the frequency of each reason given by
the position taken by commenters.
Perhaps the most striking result is the variety of reasons offered, including flood sus-
ceptibility, septic systems, environmental concerns, neighborhood character, and parking,
among other things. Moreover, there are notable differences in the reasons provided by
supporters and opponents. Supporters of new housing were significantly more likely to
mention affordability concerns. Opponents, in contrast, were more likely to raise traffic,
environmental, flooding, and safety concerns.
The reasons cited suggest that, unsurprisingly, commenters raise issues that reflect the
contexts in which their communities are situated. Almost one-quarter of opposing comments
cited traffic, and most of these highlighted specific instances of congestion. A Manchester-
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by-the-Sea woman observed that “traffic has increased at a fast rate even without the new
building” in her community. One Foxborough man “commissioned his own traffic study as he
feels the impact of cars and children on the area have not been adequately addressed. He
has lived in the area for a few years and compares the peak traffic periods to a demolition
derby.” (This commenter’s ability to commission his own traffic study also illustrates the
unrepresentative resources that many of these participants have available to them. Traffic
studies typically cost thousands of dollars.) Similarly, almost 15% of comments opposing new
housing mention flooding concerns, and many of these cited specific instances of water in
basements, yards, or nearby streets. A Newburyport woman noted that “Boyd Drive already
experienced flooding. The impact on existing homes was not assessed.” A Reading man
“explained that a couple of homes on Dustin Road have a lot of water and flooding problems,
and opined that rain gardens will not work.”
Given the historically exclusionary aims of many zoning and land use regulations (Troun-
stine 2016; Rothstein 2017), the comments may also provide a means of evaluating the
extent to which race and racial bias drive opposition to the construction of new housing.
In particular, the nearly 11 perecent of commenters who cited “neighborhood character”
in opposition to a housing project may be using racially coded language.10 Indeed, many
activists and media observers view such concerns in this light. Jacobus (2017) notes: “If
you are like me, when someone says they want to ‘preserve the character’ of a community,
what you hear is that they want to exclude poor people and people of color.” A few of the
comments that fell under the neighborhood character umbrella appear to be racialized. One
man in Beverly—a town that is 83% white—critiqued the design of a building as “ridiculous”
and said “Beverly is going to look like Chelsea.” 62% of Chelsea’s population is Hispanic (and
Chelsea is six towns away). He went on to ask if “there is a restriction put on the building
that there is to be no Section 8 housing in the building.” Several other comments in the
10Public safety may, on its face, also seem like it includes concerns evincing underlying racial biases. In
most cases, however, these comments had to do with emergency vehicle access and pedestrian safety in heavy
traffic.
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database similarly argued that their homogenous communities would resemble much more
diverse ones if a project were approved.
Most of the comments referencing neighborhood character, however, are not explicitly
linked with race. A Dighton woman opposed a project because she felt it was “not consistent
with the neighborhood. A multi-family home built on a slab is going to negatively impact
the values of homes in the neighborhood. The other homes in the neighborhood are single
family homes that are owner occupied.” There may very well be racial undertones to this
woman’s opposition—and there are almost certainly some class concerns. But, there is
nothing explicitly in her comments that clearly ties her opposition to racial bias. Many of the
comments that referenced neighborhood character across a variety of towns were remarkably
similar to hers; a Concord man “spoke in opposition to the project and the change in the
neighborhood character.” A woman in Hudson “was worried about the character of the
neighborhood and how this doesn’t fit in.”
The content of these comments also allows us to qualitatively capture the knowledge
and expertise of these commenters. Many commenters cited their professional backgrounds
in law, design, engineering, architecture, and real estate in making assessments of housing
projects that personally affected their communities. In addition, the content of many of
their comments suggested an extraordinary familiarity with highly complex local land use
regulations. Commenters would frequently cite specific statutes in arguing that a particular
project was not in compliance with local zoning regulations. One commenter in Arlington
“inquired about setbacks, the parking reduction bylaw, and whether the project would go
before the Commission.” An engineer in the town of Andover critiqued a developer’s traffic
study and stormwater analysis: “He stated that as an engineer he knows what kinds of games
can be played with numbers. He gives no credibility to these counts. He added that Merrimack
College traffic is not de minimus....He asked for a written report from the DPW on the
impacts of proceeding with the facility.” Participants in these meetings frequently displayed
a high level of knowledge—often derived from their own professional backgrounds—that they
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used when engaging in local political proceedings, consistent with our predictions.
4 Policy Impact
Given the affordability and sustainability crises facing many American cities and towns, the
participatory bias outlined above presents a potentially serious obstacle to change. Perhaps
most importantly, our results reveal that zoning board and planning board officials are
overwhelmingly hearing opposition to the construction of new housing. Often, the only voice
that these public officials (and meeting attendees) hear speaking in support of new housing
is the developer, whose financial stake in the project makes him poorly suited to make the
case that new construction is publicly beneficial.
This opposition can be persuasive. One local affordable housing lawyer we interviewed
critiqued the Massachusetts system’s emphasis on transparency as propagating exclusion: the
towns are “controlled by older and richer people than the town as a whole, and it’s bad! Under
the guise of making things more transparent, [we] end up creating a much more exclusive
system than would otherwise exist.” A housing consultant recounted that, in her experience,
neighbors’ opposition typically resulted in money for neighbors, delay, and/or changes to
the project—all of which render the project more expensive. A planning board member
in a suburban MA town similarly highlighted delay as a frequent outcome of neighborly
opposition: she “typically wouldn’t deny a project because of public opposition, but would
slow it down a lot.” Another planning board official from a different town described a recent
project delayed by months as a consequence of “older” opponents “concerned about parking.”
These delays are consequential. As another housing lawyer put it: “delay is the biggest enemy
of development....the ability of anyone to delay development is the ability to kill it.” This
corroborates academic work that implicates public opposition to new development as an
important driver of rising housing costs (Fischel 2001).
To more concretely illustrate the persuasive impact public comments have on plan-
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ning/zoning decisions, we explore the meeting minutes of two cities in depth: Cambridge and
Worcester, MA. We select these cities for several reasons. First, their meeting minutes were
unusually detailed (indeed, Cambridge’s minutes were exact transcriptions). Second, they are
both locations where we would not necessarily expect NIMBY attitudes to prevail. Cambridge
is one of the most liberal cities in the country and facing a massive affordable housing crisis;
since we found a strong association between Democratic affiliation and support for new
housing in our analysis of meeting minutes, we might expect local officials in Cambridge to
similarly prefer a greater supply of dense housing. Worcester is one of the poorest cities in
our data set; in less affluent cities, concerns about diminished tax base should, in theory,
generate more official support for new residential developments (Peterson 1981). Both cities
thus represent tough tests for observing a significant policy impact.11
Obviously, these case studies tracing the evolution of a couple of proposals cannot perfectly
measure the policy impact of these land use regulations. In an ideal world, we would be able to
randomize the implementation of measures encouraging public input in the zoning process, or
at least observe variation in these institutions. Unfortunately, because all MA towns operate
under the same zoning law mandating public input in the zoning process—and, indeed, these
regulations are widespread nationally—we do not have the cross-sectional variation to measure
policy impact in this way. Moreover, national-level data on land use regulations—including
longitudinal data—are extraordinarily difficult to generate. The most detailed available data
on land use regulations are cross-sectional MA regulations from the Housing Regulation
Database, and required several years of painstaking work to assemble (Pioneer Institute for
Public Policy Research and Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston 2005). Finally, any study
that did look for impact via changes in projects through the meeting process would also
have to account for the fact that initial proposals may reflect existing institutional contexts.
We believe, however, that these case studies—while imperfect—strongly suggest that these
meeting comments shape important policy outcomes.
11In the 2010 referendum, 80% of Cambridge voters and 65% of Worcester voters opposed repealing the
Chapter 40B law promoting affordable housing development.
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In 2016, a group of neighbors attended a Cambridge Planning Board meeting in staunch
opposition to a proposal seeking to convert an abandoned commercial warehouse into four
residential units. Neighbors worried, among other things about “density,” “insufficient
parking,” “demolition,” “building foundations,” and that “the development is very non-
compliant.” Members of the planning board took these concerns very seriously, and cited
them in making multiple additional demands of the developer. Planning board member Tom
Sienieicz observed:
This board member would find it very, very difficult tonight....in light of the input
we’ve gotten from abutters and my review of the documents, to make findings
in affirmative....It seems like there is the potential to engage in a more detailed
conversation with the community to see whether....the developer can assuage the
primary concerns of parking, of density, and the issue of settlement....I would also
include the potential....for the Board to ask for a parking analysis or a traffic
analysis.
Fellow board member Ahmed Bur built on Sienieicz’s concerns: “In addition to what Tom
said, I would also request some sort of geotech engineering study done. More than one person
mentioned houses sinking based on water.” Other members of the Cambridge Planning Board
largely echoed these concerns, similarly rooting them in neighbors’ stated objections at the
meeting.
In one of the most liberal cities of the country, a group of neighbors uniformly opposed the
development of new housing. The Cambridge Planning Board agreed that these concerns were
valid, and suggested a variety of measures imposing significant new costs on the developer,
including additional parking and geotech studies. The developer returned to the planning
board three months later in January 2017, having completed both the parking and geotech
study and altering his proposal in a number of ways to suit neighbors’ concerns: “A number of
the neighbors thought that four units was too many and whether we could actually consider
having a successful project with only three, and we’ve come to a resolution that we are
going to do that.” The developer also agreed to increase the number of parking spaces per
unit from one to two. Neighbors thus imposed multiple costs on the developer; geotech
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and parking studies cost thousands of dollars. Additional months of delay similarly impose
significant carrying costs. Finally, and most importantly, the developer has lost the value
of an additional unit and use of space now occupied by the additional parking spots. This
reduction is not only costly to the developer—it also reduces the overall housing supply in a
city desperate for more housing (and likely made each of the three remaining units larger
and more expensive). While one unit is obviously not going to have a significant impact on a
city’s overall housing supply, this process repeating itself hundreds of times starts to have a
marked influence on housing availability. Moreover, anticipation of this process might deter
meritorious projects from even being proposed and/or push the proposals that are made in
the direction of more expensive, higher end, units to make the economics work.
This policy impact is also evident in less affluent cities, where concerns about diminished
tax base should, in theory, generate more official support for new residential developments.
A proposed 36-unit condominium in Worcester, MA met steep neighborhood opposition at at
a 2015 Worcester Zoning Board meeting. One man cited his status as a representative of
the Brown Square Neighborhood Group and former zoning board member to question the
legality of the proposal. The meeting minutes describe his views: “He stated that he does not
believe the proposal meets the statute regulations to be considered hardship. He believes
that the petition should be denied and that the developer is only looking to maximize for
profitability. This does not fit in with the character of the neighborhood.” Another man
similarly worried about negative impacts on “neighborhood character and social structures”
as well as “property values.”
As in our example in Cambridge, Worcester Zoning Board members were deeply concerned
about neighborhood opposition. Meeting minutes described one board member’s response
to neighborhood opposition in the 2015 meeting concerning the development of low-rise
condominiums:
Mr. Abramoff [Worcester Zoning Board Chair] stated that he believes that
the design looks like this is an institution. The project needs to have a lot of
landscaping to be more appealing. He is concerned the density is very high and
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also about the amount of impervious area. He would like to see the applicant
meet with the neighborhood again because right now there is a big gap from what
is proposed to what the neighbors want.
Other board members concurred in a unanimous vote. This meant that discussion of the
proposal would be continued through the next meeting six weeks later, and that construction
approval was delayed by a further two months. At the subsequent meeting, neighborhood
opposition to the proposed low-rise condominium development remained intense, despite
the developer having reduced the number of housing units from 36 to 24. This neighbor’s
comments perhaps most succinctly described his community’s concerns: “[NAME] stated
that there was no compromise or agreement at the neighborhood meeting. They do not want
to this type of project in the neighborhood.” The board agreed: “Mr. Wanat [Worcester
Zoning Board member] stated that the applicant addressed some of his concerns, but that he
is concerned with this development not quite fitting in to the neighborhood and the traffic
that will be due to the density. Mr. Haddon concurred.” The developer opted to withdraw
his proposal at this point; neighborhood opposition successfully killed the project.
The fact that neighborhood opposition had such a potent impact is striking, and speaks
to the generalizability of the political inequality we have document in this article. Worcester
is not the sort of advantaged city frequently featured in media and academic accounts of
NIMBYism. As a former industrial city 40 miles outside of Boston, Worcester has considerably
lagged the Greater Boston region’s explosive economic growth. It nonetheless features housing
policy dynamics that would not be out of place in San Francisco or Palo Alto.
These case illustrate the potential of citizens to persuade local officials; commenters
have other means, however, of effecting policy. Frequent attendance at meetings also in
some instances indicates citizens’ willingness to pursue legal challenges against developers
and/or the city/town. Multiple individuals in our data set attended meetings with lawyers or
identified themselves as lawyers opposing projects in a personal capacity. In a few cases, we
were able to match individuals in our data set with lawsuits filed in the Massachusetts Land
Court on the development in question. Given the importance of lawsuits as a key avenue for
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stymying development (Glaeser and Ward 2009), such implied threats (or actual lawsuits)
can have a potent impact.
Finally, prior research using these data shows that the most highly regulated places in
MA permit the least multifamily housing (Glaeser and Ward 2009). This fact is consistent
with public meetings constraining the supply of housing. In the absence of stringent land
use regulations, housing developments can be constructed “by right,” without necessitating
any planning or zoning board meetings. In contrast, review of variance requests by these
boards—in concert with public meetings—is associated with production of significantly less
multifamily housing.
4.1 Generalizing Beyond Massachusetts
One potential limitation of our analyses is that all of our data are from one state: Mas-
sachusetts. It is possible that Massachusetts’ town meeting tradition and strong local zoning
control (1) lead to a particularly unrepresentative set of citizens who oppose new housing
development and/or (2) make housing opponents particularly impactful. While we are unable
to rigorously quantify meeting participation in other states, suggestive evidence indicates
that these trends hold, at least to some extent, elsewhere. First, we conducted detailed
case studies of the zoning codes in six cities with widely varying institutional and regional
contexts: Charleston, SC, Charlotte, NC, Los Angeles, CA, Milwaukee, WI, Phoenix, AZ,
and San Francisco, CA. The zoning codes in all six cities mandate the solicitation of public
input at multiple stages in the development process, confirming that analogous procedures to
those in the Boston area are present elsewhere.
In addition, we surveyed 115 mayors of cities over 75,000 (a response rate of 25%).12
Among other topics, we asked mayors whether they believed housing development was more
influenced by “majority public opinion” or a “small group with strong views.” 60% of mayors
12We recruited mayors of all cities over 75,000 with a combination of personalized emails and phone calls.
All interviews were conducted over the phone, ensuring that we spoke directly with mayors. The survey
covered a wide array of topics, including climate change, federalism, and race.
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selected “small group with strong views,” and, in more qualitative elaborations, described
opposition remarkably similar to that captured in our Massachusetts data. Multiple mayors
mentioned dominant elderly groups, while others highlighted the impact of well-organized
oppositional neighborhood associations. Interestingly, in all cases, mayors who elaborated on
the “small groups” in their cities mentioned individuals/groups who opposed the construction
of new housing—consistent with our finding that meeting attendees overwhelmingly oppose
housing development.
Finally, we highlight one case with a differing institutional and socioeconomic context:
Milwaukee, WI. While NIMBYism has been well-documented in coastal cities like Boston
and San Francisco, comparatively less media and scholarly attention has focused on whether
opposition to higher density holds in less affluent communities with lower housing prices
like deindustrializing Milwaukee—which, unlike many of the Massachusetts cities/towns,
is governed by a strong mayor system rather than a town meeting. Nonetheless, at least
in pockets of the city, media accounts and comments from local officials suggest that an
unrepresentative group of neighbors dominate public hearings in similar ways that we observe
in eastern Massachusetts. On multiple occasions, after attending hearings concerning housing
developments in gentrifying parts of the city, Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett has remarked,
“I didn’t realize everyone on the East Side was an architect” (Jannene 2014). An interview
with a Milwaukee alderman confirmed that the mayor used this comment repeatedly and was
struck by “well-informed design critiques from professors” at local community meetings. The
alderman noted at his community meetings that there were “a lot of regulars” and that he
“know[s] who I’m going to run into....architects and lawyers. Lawyers show up in lawyerly
manner.” He also believed—as we found in our limited quantitative data analysis—that a
disproportionate share of meeting attendees were homeowners, not renters.
Perhaps more importantly, the Milwaukee alderman—like the individuals interviewed in
Massachusetts—believed that the individuals who attended these meetings had important
policy impact. He noted that “the voices of abutters carry a lot of weight,” in how he voted
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on a development project and that, in some cases it “only takes one voice” to influence
a project. Local political bloggers similarly highlighted cases of neighborhood opposition
delaying projects by months (Jannene 2012, 2014).
5 Prescriptions for Local Democracy
This paper has uncovered two related forms of bias. The first is that an unrepresentative
group disproportionately participates in public meetings concerning housing development.
The second is that the concentrated costs and diffuse benefits of housing development spur a
group of highly affected individuals to both participate and oppose new housing.
The first can potentially be addressed with measures that help to mitigate disparities in
participation. In particular, policymakers could do more to include renters in the housing
development process. While there is some evidence that renters express hostility towards
housing development (Hankinson 2018), Marble and Nall (2017) find that renters exhibit more
progressive attitudes towards new housing compared with homeowners. One way to enhance
renter participation is to ensure that they are aware of developments in their community. In
many Massachusetts communities, notices are mailed to property-owning abutters. In other
words, notices are sent to landlords, not their tenants who actually reside in the abutting
properties (e.g. Town of Arlington 2016). In many cases, then, individuals who live nearby
may not even be aware of proposed housing developments. Fung (2006) notes that, for
institutions of empowered participation to operate effectively, they must be structured in
ways that encourage participation by all.
The bias towards opposition is harder to address, in part because it is normatively murkier
whether it is problematic that the most affected individuals are the most likely to participate
and oppose projects. While there are broader negative societal consequences of failing to
increase the supply of housing, the era of developer-dominated politics suggests that ignoring
(or even not privileging) abutters’ concerns is also normatively problematic. Policymakers
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might consider restructuring public hearings to encourage greater deliberation and genuine
responsiveness to participating interlocutors (Fung 2006; Gutmann and Thompson 2012). Of
course, genuine deliberation requires the representation of all sides of a debate. With only
15 percent of comments in support of new housing, it is difficult to imagine a well-informed
back-and-forth policy discussion surrounding many of the housing developments in many of
these meeting minutes.
Finally, these meetings raise important questions about the level of expertise needed to
participate in public deliberation (Fung 2006). Many of the commmenters exhibit a high level
of specialized knowledge about local land use and zoning. On the one hand, this bias towards
high knowledge could dissuade some underrepresented voices from speaking up at meetings.
On the other, as a society, we may want individuals to have a base level of knowledge about
local land use prior to participating in important policy debates surrounding housing.
While this paper has uncovered some troubling participatory biases in public meetings,
these issues do not necessarily mean that neighborhood-level politics are inherently unrep-
resentative. Scholars have identified other policy arenas where these meetings do appear
to significantly enhance the participation of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups (Fung
2006). Moreover, a developer-dominated system like the one that existed prior to the move-
ment towards neighborhood participation is unlikely to yield significantly better outcomes
in terms of affordability. Similarly, moving towards a system in which elites on zoning and
planning boards wield the greatest influence may not necessarily yield greater democratic
accountability; indeed, the demographic and attitudinal composition of zoning and planning
board members may not be so different than that of meeting attendees. We hope that
future research can build upon our findings to improve the functionality of these public
meetings and that political scientists and policymakers alike can learn important lessons
about implementing higher quality democracies from these meeting minutes.
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Every time a public participant at a zoning or planning meeting was identified by name and
address, and spoke about a project that implicated multiple housing units, we coded a) their
information, b) information about the address of the project they spoke about, c) whether
they were supportive, neutral, or opposed and, when they gave reasons or asked questions
about topics that fit into one of our 20 categories. The two major coding decisions were a)
how to code the participant’s tone and b) how to code their reasons.
Tone The support/neutral/oppose variable is coded support or oppose if the coder can
detect any hint in either direction. Most supportive comments were quite explicit and included
phrases such as “I support this project,” and “this is good for the town” Oppose comments
fell into two categories. Some explicitly expressed opposition in general: “this is bad for the
town,” “I’m opposed to this project.” Other comments coded “oppose” focused on specific
reasons (see below) with a negative tone or valence: “I’m worried about traffic,” “it will make
the street more dangerous,” or “it doesn’t fit the neighborhood.” Comments coded neutral
were generally sincere, or at least neutrally phrased questions. Asking “How will this affect
the wildlife” would be coded neutral. Many of these neutral comments likely came from
skeptical or even opposed residents who couched their views in a formally neutral question.
We coded these as neutral rather than try to guess or assume why they were asking about
things with a negative valence. This should make the coding reasonably conservative.
Content When possible, we coded the substance of each commenter using the scheme
depicted in Table 5. We allowed for multiple content areas per commenter such that a person
who raised both traffic and environmental concerns would get both comment codes.
Data Matching
We matched the commenter data to a Massachusetts voter file from the voter data firm
Nation Builder. For each comment, the only available fields to identify the commenter were
their town, name, and address. We used probabilistic string matching on names and addresses
using the Stata reclink2 package. We manually reviewed each match to eliminate false
matches.
We matched commenters to the voter file using three different combinations of the available
fields. In all combinations, we required that the voter’s mailing address town corresponded
to the town of the meeting.
1. First name, last name, address, town: 94% of matches
2. First name, last name, town: 5% of matches. Each match reviewed to verify that first
name differences were due to plausible nicknames or middle names.
3. First name from commenters to Middle name from voter file, address, town: 1% of
matches.
A small number of matches (10) were rejected because the commenter matched to multiple
people in the voter file. Most often, one commenter matched to a father and son with the
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same name and address. Without suffixes or middle initials, we were unable to differentiate
between these pairs.
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Table 5: Comment issue coding scheme
Density Arguments that the new development will make the population too dense
in the area
Height/Shadows The building will be too tall/short and will cast unacceptable shadows.
Includes arguments about wind from the building (often a result of the
height)
Parking Too much strain on parking, proposal doesn’t account for enough parking.
Traffic Vehicular traffic only (not pedestrian)
Schools Arguments that the development will harm/improve/influence the quality
of the local public schools
Affordability Arguments about the development increasing housing prices, including
affordable housing, etc. includes income diversity
Diversity Arguments about impact on diversity. Includes disabilities (handicap
accessible)
Flooding Construction may lead to flooding either during or after. Project may
affect drainage
Building Foundation Construction will damage the foundation of neighboring buildings
Noise Construction causing noise or the development making the area noisier
Privacy New housing too close with views into property and other related concerns
Trees/Green
Space/Environment
Arguments about trees, parks, green space, wildlife, and environmental
impact, includes air pollution concerns
Aesthetics "It’s ugly" “it doesn’t match the other buildings” “building doesn’t fit”
Includes arguments about visual and historic character of area.
Not compliant with
zoning
Complaining the development does not comply with zoning laws (often
argue that zoning laws are agreed to after a collective participatory process,
therefore should not be ignored)
Safety Raises safety concerns about children, snow removal, intersections etc.
Pedestrian Includes pedestrian/bicycle traffic. Also sidewalk issues
Neighborhood Charac-
ter
To show difference between density and explicit fears of socioeco-
nomic/racial diversity, arguments about preserving history and questions
of “fit” that are not about the building itself. Concerns about who will
be moving into the neighborhood and using neighborhood resources; ar-
guments that this is a “great addition to the neighborhood.” Arguments
about “changing” the neighborhood
Home value/city rev-
enues
Includes arguments about a development decreasing property values and
reducing city revenues, “hurting my property values” or questions about
whether a property will be a “net financial gain for the city”
Septic/water system Only applies to suburbs without sewer systems.
Corruption Comments about unethical dealings, corrupt officials, developers cheating
residents. Requires more than saying that developers have not listened to
residents
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Table 6: Top 10 Reasons Given by Position Taken
Support Neutral Oppose
Aesthetics (11.1%) Environment (14.3%) Traffic (23.1%)
Density (9.7%) Septic/Water (8.2%) Environment (18.6%)
Affordability (9.5%) Flooding (7.0%) Flooding (14.9%)
Environment (9.3%) Traffic (6.6%) Safety (14.8%)
Neighborhood Character (6.9%) Aesthetics (5.6%) Density (11.9%)
Parking (5.6%) Parking (4.2%) Aesthetics (11.9%)
Traffic (5.3%) Pedestrian Impact (3.5%) Septic/Water (10.9%)
Home Values/City Finances (5.3%) Safety (3.4%) Neighborhood Character (10.5%)
Pedestrian Impact (5.0%) Non-Compliance (3.3%) Parking (9.9%)
Diversity (5.0%) Home Values/City Finances (3.2%) Non-Compliance (7.1%)
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